The fall of the Assad regime was presented by many in the West as the end of Iranian influence in Syria and a strategic defeat of the so-called “Axis of Resistance”.
In reality, however, behind the weakening of Tehran, another, deeper rearrangement of power is unfolding, that of the gradual transformation of northern Syria and parts of the Eastern Mediterranean into a zone of permanent Turkish influence.
What Ankara is attempting today is not a mere regional expansion of influence. It is building a new geopolitical ecosystem where Turkey will not only function as a military power, but as the administrative, economic, technological and ideological center of a wider neo-Ottoman space.
The analysis of Amine Ayoub in the Jerusalem Post illuminates part of this strategy. But the picture becomes even more alarming when combined with data from the Middle East Forum, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), Chatham House and European security reports, which document Ankara’s systematic use of Islamist networks, economic dependencies and technological infrastructure.
Identical model of dependency
Turkey is no longer simply seeking “influence” in Syria. It is attempting to form an idiosyncratic model of dependency. This is not a classical form of “soft power”, but a structural replacement of the basic functions of the state, where local administrative and security institutions function as extensions of the Turkish state architecture.
The first tool is political Islam and in particular the networks of the Muslim Brotherhood.For years, the Erdogan government has been hosting, funding and politically protecting Brotherhood officials in Istanbul. Since the collapse of the Assad regime, these networks are emerging as the “soft” administrative apparatus of the next day.
The model is highly functional for Ankara. Turkey avoids the costs of a formal occupation while gaining control through local dependent mechanisms. Damascus may formally rule, but strategic decisions, the economy and infrastructure are increasingly determined by Turkish filters.
Variables and Limits
Despite the dynamics of this strategy, the model is not without risks. Local discontent with Turkish tutelage remains a critical variable that could undermine the long-term stability of the project. The history of the Middle East has repeatedly shown that even the most organized regional strategies encounter limits when confronted with ethnic, racial and religious resistance.
At the same time, Ankara is attempting to extend this model to Lebanon. The strengthening of Sunni Islamist organizations in Tripoli and the Aqar region shows that Turkey is seeking to establish a permanent footprint in the eastern Mediterranean basin.
However, this Turkish expansion is not operating in a vacuum. The role of Russia, which remains a key player in Syria, must be taken into account. Moscow may have been weakened since the fall of Assad, but it is unlikely to accept full Turkish domination in a region where it maintains strategic bases and historical footholds. The interaction – confrontational or cooperative – between Moscow and Ankara will largely determine the boundaries of this neo-Ottoman space.
The second tool is economic dependence. Turkish giants with close ties to the Erdogan regime (such as Cengiz, Limak, Kalyon, Kolin and Makyol) have already positioned themselves at the core of the Syrian “reconstruction”. The same companies that were involved in flagship projects of strategic importance for Turkey are now infiltrating Syria’s energy, road and air infrastructure.
When a country’s education, telecommunications, hospitals, transport and energy are organized through Turkish institutions and Turkish capital, a new generation of political and administrative elite is created that will see Ankara as a natural center of reference.
With technology as an ally
The third and perhaps most important tool is technology, and drones in particular. The creation of a network of “drone infrastructure” in northern Syria can be the foundation of a new form of control: an “air corridor” connecting Anatolia with northern Syria, Lebanon and the eastern Mediterranean.
The transition from commercial use to military exploitation of this infrastructure can be almost instantaneous, as the same technological platform serves logistics, surveillance and operational capabilities. This is precisely what makes Ankara’s strategy so difficult to counter by traditional Western deterrence tools.
This is where the Blue Homeland connection becomes critical. Turkish strategy is no longer limited to the sea. It extends to the air, data networks and digital infrastructure. What is most worrying for the West is that Turkey is implementing this strategy without Iran’s “noisy” methods. Instead, it is using its NATO status and trade relations with Europe to expand below the threshold of triggering Western reflexes.
Turkey is attempting to become an autonomous power pole. For Greece, Cyprus and the overall balance in the Eastern Mediterranean, this is not a theoretical development. It is a strategic reality that requires vigilance and strategic readjustment. Because in the Eastern Mediterranean, a new balance of power is not just taking shape. A new system of regional dependency is gradually taking shape, with Ankara at its centre.
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