{"id":10316,"date":"2026-06-12T10:07:00","date_gmt":"2026-06-12T07:07:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/?p=10316"},"modified":"2026-06-12T10:07:00","modified_gmt":"2026-06-12T07:07:00","slug":"ankara-is-challenging-tehran-for-leadership-of-islamic-extremism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/?p=10316","title":{"rendered":"Ankara is challenging Tehran for leadership of Islamic extremism"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Recent statements <b>Erdogan <\/b>that Israeli operations in <b>Syria <\/b>and in <b>Lebanon <\/b>now pose a threat to <b>Turkey <\/b>was not just another harsh anti-Israeli stance.<\/p>\n<p>It was something deeper. It was an indirect admission of how the current Turkish leadership perceives its country\u2019s role in the Middle East. When the Turkish president appears to link the security of <b>Turkey to Damascus, <\/b><b>Aleppo<\/b>, <b>Beirut<\/b>, or even <b>Cyprus<\/b>, he is not merely describing <b>threats<\/b>.It describes a geopolitical revisionism.<\/p>\n<p>For decades, the main power seeking to export ideological influence and build networks of armed allies in the <b>Middle East was Iran. <\/b>Tehran <\/b>invested in <b>Hezbollah<\/b>, in Shiite militias in Iraq, the <b>Houthis in Yemen<\/b>, and a broader network that became known as the \u201cAxis of Resistance.\u201d However, developments in recent years have significantly shifted the balance of power. <b>Hamas <\/b>has suffered severe setbacks, Hezbollah faces<b> serious pressures<\/b> within <b>Lebanon<\/b>, while Iranian influence has suffered repeated strategic setbacks. The question that arises is who is attempting to fill the void that is being created.<\/p>\n<p>The answer seems to lie increasingly in <b>Ankara<\/b>. Turkey is not attempting to <b>succeed Iran<\/b> as a Shiite power. However, it is attempting to emerge as<b> a political and geopolitical center<\/b> of a different sphere: a network of Sunni <b>Islamist movements, <\/b>organizations, and political formations, stretching from <b>Gaza to Syria <\/b>and from North <b>Africa <\/b>to the <b>Eastern Mediterranean. <\/b><\/p>\n<p>It is, however, crucial to emphasize that this endeavor is not taking place in a <b>vacuum<\/b>. Turkey is called upon to manage the skepticism of traditional powers, such as <b>Saudi Arabia and Egypt,<\/b> which also claim the title of leader of the Sunni world. This is a fierce competition for regional hegemony.<\/p>\n<p>It is no coincidence that for years <b>Ankara <\/b>has maintained close ties with <b>Hamas<\/b>. This picture does not emerge solely from Erdogan\u2019s rhetoric. It is also rooted in Ankara\u2019s long-standing policy choice to maintain open <b>channels <\/b>with organizations and movements linked to the broader sphere of the <b>Muslim Brotherhood. <\/b><\/p>\n<p>The <b>hospitality <\/b>extended to <b>Hamas <\/b>officials <b>in <\/b>Turkey<\/b>, the Turkish leadership\u2019s repeated contacts with representatives of the organization, the revelations by international investigative media regarding the extent of these relations, as well as the role of organizations such as IHH, which played a leading role in the <b>\u201cMavi Marmara\u201d<\/b>, paint a picture far broader than traditional diplomatic support for the <b>Palestinians<\/b>. For the Erdo\u011fan government, these networks serve as useful multipliers of political and ideological influence.<\/p>\n<p>At the same time, Turkey<b> is playing a complex game,<\/b> attempting to balance this revisionist agenda with its status as a member of <b>NATO<\/b>, a dual identity that has now become the central \u201c<b>thorn<\/b>\u201d in its relations with the <b>West<\/b>.<\/p>\n<p>Even more revealing is the case of <b>Syria<\/b>. The collapse of the <b>Assad <\/b>regime did not merely create a new geopolitical landscape. It also created a historic opportunity for Turkey to expand its influence in a country it increasingly views as part of its own strategic zone. <\/p>\n<p>The emergence of<b> new leadership <\/b>in Damascus following Assad\u2019s fall offers Ankara a unique opportunity to influence the shaping of the new Syrian state, to an extent that no other regional power currently possesses.<\/p>\n<p>It is precisely this strategy that explains the increasingly intense confrontation with <b>Israel<\/b>. For the Erdogan government, the issue is not just about Gaza or the fate of the Palestinians. It concerns who will determine the <b>balance of power <\/b>in the new Middle East taking shape following Iran\u2019s weakening. <\/p>\n<p>Israel <b>seeks to <b>prevent <\/b>the emergence of <b>new centers of Islamist power<\/b> on its borders. Turkey, on the other hand, is increasingly emerging as a political protector of forces that <b>Tel Aviv<\/b> considers a threat to its security. This conflict is not circumstantial&#8230; It is structural!<\/p>\n<p>The repercussions of this development are not limited to the Middle East. They directly concern <b>Greece and Cyprus<\/b>. Erdogan\u2019s references to the Eastern Mediterranean, the link between the <b>Cyprus issue<\/b>with regional developments, and Ankara\u2019s attempt to present itself as the protective power of a broader Islamic and geopolitical space are all part of the same strategic vision. This is a concept that combines neo-Ottomanism, revisionism, and the religious legitimization of regional power. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Erdogan&#8217;s recent statements that Israeli operations in Syria and Lebanon now pose a threat to &#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":10317,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10316","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-blog"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10316","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=10316"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10316\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/10317"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=10316"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=10316"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=10316"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}