The West <\/b>is not just facing a credibility problem with Turkey<\/b>. <\/p>\n
It faces a deeper, more complex and more dangerous<\/b> question: How can a pillar of NATO <\/b>function simultaneously as a hub of influence for Islamist networks<\/b> and as a channel of contact with forces that directly challenge<\/b> the Western order?<\/b><\/p>\n
The occasion for the resurgence of this question is a recent report in the Nordic Monitor<\/b> – a medium staffed by Turkish<\/b> self-exiled journalists critical of the regime Erdogan<\/b> – according to which ISIS appears to be moving into a new phase of activity within Turkey, even setting up militant training structures. The same media outlet claims that Turkey has already acted as a hub<\/b> for the transit, financing and organization of jihadist<\/b> networks with links to Europe.<\/p>\n
No matter the degree of confirmation of these claims, the crucial element is not just one more publication on this issue… It is the overall picture that has emerged in recent years from analyses by international media and think tanks<\/b>.<\/p>\n
Turkey is not just a “difficult ally”<\/b>. According to an analysis by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies<\/b>, Angara<\/b> has served as a “forward base” for Islamist networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and branches of the jihadist family, and cases of hosting or tolerating individuals with connections<\/b> to extremist organizations<\/b> have been documented.<\/b><\/p>\n
In the same context is its stance<\/b> towards Hamas<\/b>. Not only has Turkey not labelled it a terrorist organisation<\/b>, but Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself has described it as a “resistance movement”, while its leading members move and operate within Turkish territory. At the same time, political and rhetorical support for Hamas has intensified post-2023, with Ankara openly adopting a confrontational<\/b> stance towards Israel<\/b>.<\/p>\n
This stance is not merely ideological. It is strategic<\/b>. Turkey is attempting to position itself as a leading power in the Sunni Islamic world<\/b>, claiming a role that historically – and until recently – Iran<\/b> held in the Shiite axis. And herein lies the most critical geopolitical shift.<\/p>\n
Iran’s weakening, whether due to internal pressures or external conflicts, is creating a power center<\/b> in the Middle East<\/b>. Ankara seems ready to cover it<\/b>. Not as a stabilizing factor, but as a power, leveraging networks, ideology and regional conflicts to enhance its own influence.<\/p>\n
At the same time, Turkey<\/b> maintains a complex web of relations with Russia, Iran and China<\/b>. It cooperates energetically<\/b> with Moscow<\/b>, maintains regular consultation with Tehran<\/b> on regional issues, and is included – albeit selectively – in the Eurasian designs of the Pekin<\/b>. It is a strategy of multidimensional balancing, but it is gradually turning into a geopolitical divergence<\/b> from the West.<\/p>\n
All this while remaining a full member of NATO<\/b>. This is the real problem. It’s not that Turkey has different priorities. It’s that its priorities conflict<\/b> now directly with the interests and security<\/b> of the West. Hosting or tolerating networks linked to Islamist organisations, political support for groups like Hamas, aggressive rhetoric against Israel and simultaneous geopolitical convergence with Western rivals make up a picture that can no longer be understood<\/b>.<\/p>\n
So a new concern is taking shape in more and more Western decision-making centers… Not whether Turkey is “necessary<\/b>“, but whether it is now reliable<\/b>.<\/p>\n
Because history has shown that the biggest cracks<\/b> do not come from opponents<\/b>, but from allies<\/b>, who change sides without declaring it. And Turkey seems to be moving in exactly this grey area.<\/p>\n
.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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