{"id":11933,"date":"2026-06-20T20:14:00","date_gmt":"2026-06-20T17:14:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/?p=11933"},"modified":"2026-06-20T20:14:00","modified_gmt":"2026-06-20T17:14:00","slug":"hamas-secret-files-how-it-caught-the-israelis-off-guard","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/?p=11933","title":{"rendered":"Hamas&#8217; Secret Files: How It Caught the Israelis Off Guard"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>New secret internal documents from <b>Hamas <\/b>have been provided by the Israeli military\u2019s intelligence services to the<b> Amit Institute for Terrorism and Intelligence Research<\/b>*, which were published exclusively by the Jerusalem Post last Thursday (June 18, 2026).<\/p>\n<p>The documents contain shocking details revealing the evolution of <b>Hamas\u2019s secret plans from 2022 to 2023 to systematically deceive Israel<\/b> in order to take the Israeli army by surprise during the October 7 massacre.<\/p>\n<p>Although much is already known about Hamas\u2019s deception, these original documents have not been made public before and reveal the puzzle of the strategy and tactics followed by Hamas.<\/p>\n<p>In one of them, dated <b>September 13, 2022<\/b> and titled \u201c<b>Building a Strategic Deception Plan<\/b>,\u201d the document describes the plan that served as the basis for Hamas\u2019s surprise attack on Israel. <\/p>\n<p>Among other things, it outlines the strategic deception plan (diplomatic, military, economic, and public relations) which would include promoting the issue of an exchange (ongoing negotiations at that time for the return of two living and two deceased Israeli civilians who had been held hostage by Hamas prior to 2023) with Prime Minister Yair Lapid. <\/p>\n<p>It is worth noting that Lapid served as prime minister from mid-2022 through December 2022.<\/p>\n<p>The same document notes that Hamas operatives \u201c<b>are manning the military [border] positions at a normal pace and continue their exercises as a matter of routine until the start of the pressure campaign, which will serve as the appropriate pretext for reducing (open military activities)<\/b>.\u201d <\/p>\n<p>It is also emphasized that Hamas will \u201ctake action to summon the fighters of the Nuhba force repeatedly and in various ways, so that the \u2018enemy\u2019 (Israel) loses the ability to determine the timing of the attack.\u201d <\/p>\n<p>According to the document, Hamas must make a special effort to assess specific moments when its forces <b>will be particularly ready to attack and when Israel and Israeli defense forceswill have reduced focus<\/b> <b>on defense<\/b>.<\/p>\n<p>Elsewhere, Hamas recommends increasing the frequency of routine exercises involving certain forces moving to and from the border in a way that could confuse Israeli. <\/p>\n<p>It also proposes sending high-ranking commanders to the border more frequently and increasing the overall presence of Hamas terrorists there to make it even more difficult for Israeli Defense Forces to notice that something unusual might be happening.<\/p>\n<p>Subsequently, the Amit Center notes in its own analysis that senior Hamas officials later proudly admitted that they had used a systematic deception plan to fool IsraelIsrael and the IDF into a false sense of security, leading them to believe that the Gaza-based terrorist group was too demoralized to pose any real threat. According to the Center, this deception plan involved Hamas stepping back during multiple rounds of conflict between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, even at the cost of appearing weak in the Gaza Strip in the short term.<\/p>\n<p>The <b>top Hamas officials<\/b> were entirely willing to appear weaker in the short term to deceive Israel, so that the larger \u201cgrand plan\u201d for a surprise attack on Israel would later catch the Jewish state completely off guard.<\/p>\n<p>In the intelligence center\u2019s report, these officials are quoted as saying that they \u201cemployed unprecedented intelligence tactics to confuse Israel, including convincing Israelis that Hamas was afraid to go to war and simply wanted to improve its economic situation.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>According to the report, Hamas continued to send misleading and pro-negotiation messages to Israel even in the days leading up to October 7. Then, one year later, there is a document dated September 25, 2023\u2014Document Five\u2014titled \u201cStatus Update on the Second Phase of Pressure\u201d from Mohammed Odeh (who later briefly served as Hamas leader in May 2026 before being assassinated) to Yahya Sinwar.<\/p>\n<p>According to information published by the newspaper, \u201cthe additional pressure on the \u2018enemy\u2019 led it to cooperate more closely with <b>\u2018intermediaries<\/b>\u2019 (such as the Qataris) to calm the situation.\u201d The movement (i.e., Hamas) presented official terms regarding humanitarian aid.\u201d <\/p>\n<p>Regarding the strategy that led to the invasion, which took place just two weeks later, the document emphasizes the importance of continuing the protests (by activists and humanitarian organizations) until Hamas\u2019s goals are achieved. \u201cExperience has shown that the enemy responds only to pressure. <\/p>\n<p><b>Jewish holidays represent opportunities in the short and medium term, there is a desire to calm things down <\/b> in order to facilitate normalization with the Saudis and avoid any connection between the various fronts, according to a Hamas analysis of the current situation,\u201d the same report states.<\/p>\n<p>The terrorists\u2019 tactics regarding the mobilization of political organizations to manipulate public opinion are revealed in one of the six documents as follows: \u201cOur humanitarian goals are limited, and we can achieve them through patience and sustained pressure, so that the amount of pressure and effort is commensurate with the scope of our achievements.\u201d <\/p>\n<p>Furthermore, the <b>document states that pressure should be intensified on September 24<\/b>, but should be reduced on September 25\u201327. \u201cThis brief window will give the enemy time to respond, time to speak with the negotiators, and time to move more personnel and resources toward the border to escalate the conflict further (on September 28\u201329).\u201d <\/p>\n<p>All of this took place a few days before the massacre of October 7, where it is noted that \u201cthe movement must ensure that other armed groups do not escalate the clashes at the border, which could be used to undermine Hamas\u2019s control over the implementation of a grand plan.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The same document then lists the slogans that should be heard at the organized and, above all\u2026 \u201c<b>spontaneous<\/b>\u201d <b>protests<\/b>, focusing on Israeli oppression of Palestinians in the West Bank, the lifting of the blockade of<b>Gaza Sea<\/b> (which explains the flotillas), the right to work, the right to travel, etc. <\/p>\n<p>Instructions are also being issued to all military forces to be ready to act, and comprehensive efforts will be made with Qatar, Turkey, Algeria, and Kuwait to continue pressuring Israel to improve the humanitarian situation. <\/p>\n<p>Curiously, <b>Hamas recommended sending a delegation of citizens to visit parliaments around the world <\/b>to rally support for ending the naval blockade of Gaza and to encourage weekly and monthly demonstrations outside U.S. embassiesthe world for the same purpose.<\/p>\n<p>Another Hamas strategy was to push for linking the Palestinian cause with the issue of Israeli territorial restoration in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. <\/p>\n<p>This <b>six-page document<\/b> dated October 2, 2023\u2014just five days before the invasion\u2014contains a \u201clist of attendees from a copy of the Hamas Political Bureau,\u201d which was the last major meeting of that high-level committee. <\/p>\n<p>Of the committee\u2019s 22 members, the document notes that seven were absent, including Khalil al-Hayya, Bassam Naim, and Kamal Abu Oun, with the reason for their absence listed as \u201ctravel.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The first of the aforementioned, at that time, was traveling to Qatar, where he would serve as Hamas\u2019s chief negotiator on hostages and ceasefires during the war. He remains one of Hamas\u2019s top officials, even though so many have been killed by the Israeli Defense Forces. It is worth noting that since Odeh was killed, Hamas has not announced a new military leader.<\/p>\n<p>* <b>The Amit Center is run by former senior officials from IDF intelligence, the Mossad, and the Shin Bet<\/b> (Israel Security Agency), and had special access to Hamas documents seized by IDF intelligence, in addition to high-level open-source research.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>New secret internal Hamas documents have been provided by the Israeli military\u2019s intelligence services to the Institute for Terrorism Research&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":11934,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11933","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-world"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11933","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=11933"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11933\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/11934"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=11933"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=11933"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=11933"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}