{"id":5108,"date":"2026-05-12T10:11:00","date_gmt":"2026-05-12T07:11:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/?p=5108"},"modified":"2026-05-12T10:11:00","modified_gmt":"2026-05-12T07:11:00","slug":"new-turkish-provocations-with-blue-homeland-and-alleged-maps","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/?p=5108","title":{"rendered":"New Turkish provocations with &#8220;Blue Homeland&#8221; and alleged maps"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>A <b>bill <\/b>that will &#8220;regulate Turkey&#8217;s maritime jurisdiction zones&#8221; in its entirety&#8221; <b>Turkey<\/b>, according to reports by <b>Bloomberg <\/b> and the <b>Milliyet<\/b> newspaper. <\/p>\n<p>In 2006, <b>Jem Gurd\u00e9niz,<\/b> then director of Policy Planning at the headquarters of <b>the Turkish Navy,<\/b> coined the term <b>&#8220;Blue Homeland&#8221; (Mavi Vatan)<\/b>. As Admiral (ret.) explained, years later (newspaper &#8220;To Vima&#8221;, 9-6-2020), it was a doctrine with<b>two pillars:<\/b> on the one hand the suggestion of Turkish areas of<b>maritime jurisdiction<\/b> (<b>national sovereignty, <\/b>spatial waters, continental shelf, EEZ) and on the other hand the creation of a <b>maritime worldview<\/b> for Ankara.<\/p>\n<p>The revisionist-expansionist doctrine, under which the neighbouring country <b>claims 462,000 square<\/b> kilometres of maritime jurisdiction in <b>the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus and the Black Sea,<\/b> became state policy in October 2018. Then, speaking to <b>Anadolu<\/b>, Turkish Defense Minister, <b>Houloussi Akar<\/b>, officially unveiled the <b>Map<\/b> of the &#8220;Blue Homeland&#8221;.<\/p>\n<p>Thirteen months later, in November 2019, the <b>implementation<\/b> of the doctrine was launched, following the &#8220;maritime jurisdictions&#8221; memorandum of understanding signed by Ankara with the government of <b>Tripoli<\/b> (one of two in Libya), known as the <b>Turkish-Libyan<\/b> memorandum.<\/p>\n<p>Several years before it rolled out its maritime doctrine, the Turkish side attempted to <b>predict<\/b> Greece&#8217;s actions. In June 1995, a week after the Greek parliament ratified the <b>Law of the Sea Convention (<b>UNCLOS), the Turkish National Assembly gave the <b>green light<\/b> to the Turkish government to consider <b>a cause of war<\/b> the extension of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean beyond six nautical miles.<\/p>\n<h3>Legal claims<\/h3>\n<p>In light of Ankara&#8217;s long-standing revisionist strategy and its attempt to &#8220;normalize<\/b>&#8221; its <b>illegal<\/b> claims, the reports by Bloomberg and Milliyet about a bill to be submitted to the Turkish parliament that would &#8220;regulate its maritime jurisdiction zones as a whole&#8221; are not surprising.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Turkey is preparing to take a <b>new step<\/b> to strengthen its position in the seas, whose importance is growing, and to consolidate its legal basis. The government, with the participation of relevant state departments and experts, is working on a bill that aims to regulate <b>Turkish maritime jurisdiction zones<\/b> in a coherent manner,&#8221; Milliyet wrote, claiming that the bill attempts to create a legal basis on Turkish maritime jurisdiction zones.<\/p>\n<p>A bill that would see Ankara claim maritime jurisdiction &#8220;in <b>contested<\/b> areas of the Aegean and Mediterranean&#8221; was cited by Bloomberg, but noted that doing so &#8220;risks <b>increasing tensions<\/b> in a region with potential gas deposits<\/b>.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Turkish media, both <b>pro-government<\/b> and <b>opposition<\/b>, claimed that this is a decision that, among other things, attempts to give Ankara a negotiating advantage in possible delimitations with neighboring countries and therefore the law, once passed, will be submitted to the <b>UN<\/b>, while the possibility of a <b>Greek reaction<\/b> was not omitted.<\/b><\/p>\n<p>So far the bill has not been submitted to the Turkish parliament, and it is worth noting that Turkey is one of the countries that have not ratified <b>UNCLOS<\/b> (others are the US, Israel, etc.).<\/p>\n<h3>Athens on alert<\/h3>\n<p>Beyond the timing of the Turkish decision, the major question for <b>Athens<\/b> is whether this action will be accompanied by greater <b>scaling<\/b> on the ground by Ankara. Something that has been recorded increasingly lately (violations, harassment of a ship carrying out work south of Crete, raising alleged issues about the <b>minority<\/b>, direct threats, etc.).<\/p>\n<p>In any case, Greece has taken <b>dynamic actions<\/b> on its part in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean chessboard. In April 2025, Athens announced its <b>Marine Spatial Planning (MSP)<\/b> and two months later it designated two marine parks: one in the <b>Ionian Sea<\/b> and one in the <b>South Aegean<\/b> (Southern Cyclades).<\/p>\n<p>Subsequently, last October, <b>agreements<\/b> for exploration and exploitation in <b>marine plots<\/b> south of the Peloponnese and Crete were signed, a joint venture between <b>Chevron and Helleniq Energy<\/b>. In particular, the exploration in the sea blocks south of Crete constitutes, among other things, recognition of the Greek EEZ and the cancellation in substance of the <b>Turcovician <b>turkish<\/b> treaty. While the maritime zone delimitations with <b>Italy and Egypt<\/b><\/p>\n<p> should not be forgotten.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>A bill that will &#8220;regulate Turkey&#8217;s maritime jurisdiction zones&#8221; in its entirety, according to reports by the &#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":5109,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5108","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-politics"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5108","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=5108"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5108\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/5109"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5108"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5108"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/en.tomanifesto.gr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5108"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}