The emerging agreement between the U.S. and Iran is being presented as a major diplomatic success that could end the most dangerous war the Middle East has seen in recent decades.
However, upon calm reflection, it becomes clear that the agreement does not solve the problem. It merely shifts it… And it may create a new geopolitical reality, one that is more complex and unpredictable than the one that preceded it.
The framework currently being negotiated calls for a cessation of hostilities, the resumption of shipping in the Persian Gulf, and restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, but it does not fully address the issue of ballistic missiles and Tehran’s regional power.
The first major paradox is that almost none of the key players seem truly satisfied. Israel sees that its primary strategic goal—the definitive neutralization of the Iranian threat—is not being achieved.
Hardliners in Tehran view any compromise as an ideological retreat, while a significant portion of the American political establishment expresses reservations about whether Washington is giving up more than it is receiving.
And yet, it is precisely this mutual dissatisfaction that may be the only factor capable of making the agreement sustainable. No side has won outright, but all have avoided a conflict with unpredictable costs.
This picture, however, raises a second, even more serious question… Iran is emerging from the war economically and militarily wounded, but not defeated. The regime did not collapse.
The basic structures of power have been preserved, while its missile capabilities remain a significant tool of power. This means that Tehran can present a narrative of political survival to its domestic audience: it withstood the United States and Israel without being overthrown. For a theocratic regime that bases much of its legitimacy on resistance to the West, this is no small political asset.
This is precisely where the greatest concerns of the Arab Gulf states begin. In the short term, they certainly want de-escalation. Their economies depend on the stability of energy and trade routes, and a new crisis in the Strait of Hormuz would entail enormous economic costs.
However, at the strategic level, they know that they are still facing an Iran that has retained critical military capabilities and has proven it can survive even in the face of combined pressure from the two powerfulmilitary powers it faces. This reality can hardly instill a sense of security in them.
Perhaps the most significant outcome of the war does not concern Iran itself but rather the image of American power. For the first time in decades, several regional players may be wondering whether even the U.S. can fully impose its strategy on a regional power.
This is not a challenge to American military superiority. It is a challenge to the ability to translate military power into a definitive political outcome. This distinction is crucial, because it influences the future choices of all states in the region.
This is precisely why the days ahead will not be characterized by a balance of power, but by a search for new balances. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and the other Gulf monarchies will likely accelerate the strengthening of their own defense capabilities, seek greater strategic autonomy, and at the same time keep channels of communication open with Tehran. Not because they trust it, but because they know that it remains a powerful player in the regional system.
The Middle East, therefore, is not entering an era of peace… It is entering an era in which everyone will strive to adapt to a new balance of power. The real challenge will not be the signing of an agreement, but whether it will be able to prevent the next crisis.
Because when a war ends without a clear winner and without the root causes that sparked it having been eliminated, peace does not mark the end of the conflict. It is merely the intermission before the next ordeal.
