The electoral defeat of Viktor Orbán in Hungary gave many the impression that the era of “strong leaders” is coming to an end.
However, this is a rather optimistic interpretation of reality. Political figures may change, but models of power rarely disappear along with them. Instead, they adapt, evolve, and are often transferred from one country to another.
The real question is not whether Orbán was defeated, but whether “Orbánism” was defeated.
In recent years, international organizations and research centers have described a common trend that transcends ideological differences. The V-Dem Institute speaks of an ongoing democratic backslide, Freedom House documents a long-standing decline in political freedoms, while the CSIS points out that illiberal regimes no longer operate in isolation but exchange experiences and governance techniques.
Viktor Orbán was perhaps the most characteristic representative of the so-called “illiberal democracy.” He did not abolish elections. He did not abolish parliament. He maintained the democratic facade, but gradually shifted the balance of power in favor of the executive branch, curtailing the independence of institutions, the media, and the judicial system.
In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has followed a different path, but one with several common features. The presidential system he established after 2017 concentrated unprecedented powers in the hands of the president, while the judiciary, the public administration, and much of the media landscape came under tighter political control. For many international analysts, Turkey is no longer merely an “illiberal democracy,” but a highly centralized presidential regime with limited institutional checks and balances.
The case of Edi Rama presents different characteristics, but highlights yet another manifestation of the same phenomenon. Albania continues to declare its steadfast commitment to its European path; yet European reports and international organizations have repeatedly highlighted problems concerning the rule of law, the excessive concentration of political power, the independence of institutions, pressure on the media, and persistent corruption.
The discussion is not limited to Albania; it concerns whether a country can maintain democratic institutions while the actual balance of power gradually shifts in favor of the government.
These concerns are also reflected in the assessments of the European Commission as part of the accession process.
Interestingly, these three leaders do not come from the same political family.
Orbán represents nationalist conservatism, Rama represents social democracy, and Erdoğan represents political Islam. Nevertheless, they converge on certain practices of exercising power: strengthening the executive branch, weakening institutional checks and balances, increased influence over the media, frequent invocation of external threats to foster domestic unity, and a personality-centered political system.
This demonstrates that the current challenge facing democracies is not primarily ideological. It is institutional. Contemporary illiberal forms of governance do not overthrow democracy through coups. They slowly transform it, using the very tools of democratic legitimization.
Orbán’s defeat is certainly significant. It shows that no political system is invulnerable when social fatigue, economic hardship, and political erosion accumulate. It does not, however, mean that the model he embodied is disappearing. As long as institutions are weakened and power is concentrated in the hands of a few, the “illiberal playbook” will continue to change its protagonists without changing its essence.
Perhaps, in the end, the greatest challenge of the 21st century is not the collapse of democracies, but their gradual transformation into something that continues to be called a democracy, but functions less and less as such.
