The resignation Starmer from the premiership of United Kingdom brings back into the spotlight questions surrounding the status of the agreement to sell Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets to Turkey.
However, those who limit their analysis to political developments in London risk missing the bigger picture. Ankara’s real problem is not the change of tenant at 10 Downing Street.
It is that the Turkish Air Force is entering a period in which time is beginning to work against it.
Turkey is facing a strategic impasse that cannot be easily resolved.
Its exclusion from the F-35 program, as a consequence of its purchase of Russian S-400s, has created a gap that remains unaddressed. The agreement for the new and modernized F-16s is certainly a significant boost, but it is not enough to bridge the gap that now separates air forces entering the era of fifth-generation fighters from those remaining in the previous generation.
This situation takes on even greater significance when compared to the trajectory of the Hellenic Air Force. While Greece is gradually entering the era of the F-35, having already incorporated the Rafale and completed the upgrade of its F-16s to the Viper standard, Turkey is facing a difficult transition period. It continues to possess one of the strongest air forces in NATO, but for the first time in decades, it faces the risk of a technological gap emerging between its current capabilities and its aspirations for the future.
In international strategic literature, the term “window of vulnerability” to describe the transitional period during which a military force faces a temporary reduction in its deterrent power, as existing weapons systems age before new ones are fully integrated, thereby increasing strategic uncertainty. Much of the current evidence suggests that Turkey is on the very verge of such a window.
In this context, the Eurofighters are not a luxury option for Ankara. They are a strategic necessity. It is the only Western fighter jet capable of relatively quickly filling the operational gap until the KAAN program matures.
However, even this plan is fraught with significant uncertainties. Despite the impressive growth of the Turkish defense industry, the KAAN is still far from full operational deployment, while the development of engines, electronic systems, and certifications remains a complex and time-consuming process.
Sturmer’s resignation adds yet another variable. It does not automatically mean that the Eurofighter deal is off. However, it may cause delays, a reassessment of priorities, or shifts in the political balance in London.
After all, the Eurofighter is not exclusively a British program. It is the product of a European consortium in which Germany, Italy, and Spain also participate. Berlin, in particular, continues to play a decisive role, as it has repeatedly linked arms exports to issues of the rule of law, regional stability, and Turkey’s overall conduct.
At the same time, Ankara’s need for new fighter jets is not exclusively linked to Greece. Israel’s operations in the Middle East, the new balances of power taking shape in Syria, and the overall upgrade of air power in the region are forcing Turkey to accelerate all its defense procurement programs.
It is no coincidence that Turkey is simultaneously seeking to acquire Eurofighters, finalize the agreement on the F-16 Block 70, accelerate the KAAN program, and, in the long term, it has not abandoned its pursuit of reintegration into the F-35 program.
On the other hand, Britain is not viewing the matter exclusively through a geopolitical lens either. For London, the potential sale of the Eurofighters means preserving thousands of jobs, strengthening the defense industry, and reaffirming the country’s role as a leading exporter of advanced defense systems. The economic and industrial interests associated with the agreement remain strong, regardless of the political change at the top of the British government.
Greece must monitor developments without triumphalism but also without complacency. These “windows of opportunity” will not remain open indefinitely. Turkey has a strong defense industry, significant economic resources, and, above all, the strategic will to fill its gap. For Athens, the challenge is not to capitalize on Ankara’s difficulties, but to use the time available to further expand its own technological and operational advantage.
Starmer’s resignation may delay decisions or shift political balances. However, it is not what will determine the future of the Turkish Air Force. What will determine it is whether Ankara manages to close, in time, the “window of vulnerability” it has opened to its competitors. Because in geopolitics, time is often the most valuable—and the most expensive—weapon system.
