There are moments in geopolitics when a country ceases to be just a “problem” and becomes a factor of instability.
Turkey is exactly at this point. It is no longer the West’s “recalcitrant ally”. It is a player that systematically tests the limits of the alliance and increasingly exceeds them.
The debate, which is now opening up in international media and think tanks, is not whether Akara is moving away from the West, but whether it has already moved to a peculiar position “inside and outside” the West. And this is not about ideology, it is about power behaviour.
The key conclusion is that Turkey is no longer functioning as part of the Western security architecture, but as a force undermining it from within. Its attitude towards Hamas, its hosting of its cadres and its political cover are not situational choices. They represent a strategic departure from the interests of the US and the West as a whole.
But that is only the surface. The deeper shift is about how Turkey perceives its role: not as an ally with autonomy, but as an autonomous power pole. In an environment where Iran is weakening and the Middle East is reordering, Ankara sees a gap and is attempting to fill it. From Syria and Libya to the Caucasus and the Eastern Mediterranean, neo-Ottoman revisionism is taking on operational characteristics.
The “Too Big to Fail” doctrine
In this context, Ankara is systematically investing in a core doctrine where its geography makes it “too big to fail” in the eyes of the West. By instrumentalising migration, control of the Straits and its position next to all the major crisis fronts, it turns geography into a tool of leverage.
This strategy is based on a long-standing weakness of the West and especially Europe, that of a preference for appeasement over conflict. The expectation that Turkey will “eventually come back” acts as a trap. Instead of restraining Turkish behaviour, it encourages it. Ankara has now internalized the belief that it can violate “red lines” at no cost.
And herein lies the crucial irony: Turkey is dangerous not because it is outside the West, but because it is within it. It is a member of NATO, has access to Western systems, and knows the structures and weaknesses of the Alliance from the inside.
This double role – within and simultaneously opposite – allows it to act as an “internal reviewer”. The S-400, the blackmail in NATO enlargement, the moves in the Eastern Mediterranean and the instrumentalisation of geography are not piecemeal episodes. They constitute a coherent strategic model.
However, this apparent power structure has a clear limit, that of the Turkish economy. Its strategic overexpansion requires resources that an economy with high inflation and monetary instability has difficulty supporting.
Turkey is attempting to operate as a geopolitical giant while remaining dependent on Western markets, capital and investment. This contradiction is perhaps its only real bridle.
If the West decides to use its economic power not just as a tool of leverage but as a strategic lever, then Ankara’s “autonomy” will collide with the limits of economic reality.
Hellenism on alert
For Greece and Cyprus, this development is not theoretical. It is immediate and tangible. The Eastern Mediterranean is already a testing ground for this Turkish strategy… From maritime zones and energy to military presence and hybrid pressures. As long as the West delays to redefine its stance, the costs are being passed on to its external borders, especially to the Greek and Cypriot space.
The real question, then, is not whether Turkey is becoming the “new Iran”. It is whether the West is ready to accept that one of its pillars is gradually turning into a fault line!
