Ankara is challenging Tehran for leadership of Islamic extremism

Recent statements Erdogan that Israeli operations in Syria and in Lebanon now pose a threat to Turkey was not just another harsh anti-Israeli stance.

It was something deeper. It was an indirect admission of how the current Turkish leadership perceives its country’s role in the Middle East. When the Turkish president appears to link the security of Turkey to Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut, or even Cyprus, he is not merely describing threats.It describes a geopolitical revisionism.

For decades, the main power seeking to export ideological influence and build networks of armed allies in the Middle East was Iran. Tehran invested in Hezbollah, in Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and a broader network that became known as the “Axis of Resistance.” However, developments in recent years have significantly shifted the balance of power. Hamas has suffered severe setbacks, Hezbollah faces serious pressures within Lebanon, while Iranian influence has suffered repeated strategic setbacks. The question that arises is who is attempting to fill the void that is being created.

The answer seems to lie increasingly in Ankara. Turkey is not attempting to succeed Iran as a Shiite power. However, it is attempting to emerge as a political and geopolitical center of a different sphere: a network of Sunni Islamist movements, organizations, and political formations, stretching from Gaza to Syria and from North Africa to the Eastern Mediterranean.

It is, however, crucial to emphasize that this endeavor is not taking place in a vacuum. Turkey is called upon to manage the skepticism of traditional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which also claim the title of leader of the Sunni world. This is a fierce competition for regional hegemony.

It is no coincidence that for years Ankara has maintained close ties with Hamas. This picture does not emerge solely from Erdogan’s rhetoric. It is also rooted in Ankara’s long-standing policy choice to maintain open channels with organizations and movements linked to the broader sphere of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The hospitality extended to Hamas officials in Turkey, the Turkish leadership’s repeated contacts with representatives of the organization, the revelations by international investigative media regarding the extent of these relations, as well as the role of organizations such as IHH, which played a leading role in the “Mavi Marmara”, paint a picture far broader than traditional diplomatic support for the Palestinians. For the Erdoğan government, these networks serve as useful multipliers of political and ideological influence.

At the same time, Turkey is playing a complex game, attempting to balance this revisionist agenda with its status as a member of NATO, a dual identity that has now become the central “thorn” in its relations with the West.

Even more revealing is the case of Syria. The collapse of the Assad regime did not merely create a new geopolitical landscape. It also created a historic opportunity for Turkey to expand its influence in a country it increasingly views as part of its own strategic zone.

The emergence of new leadership in Damascus following Assad’s fall offers Ankara a unique opportunity to influence the shaping of the new Syrian state, to an extent that no other regional power currently possesses.

It is precisely this strategy that explains the increasingly intense confrontation with Israel. For the Erdogan government, the issue is not just about Gaza or the fate of the Palestinians. It concerns who will determine the balance of power in the new Middle East taking shape following Iran’s weakening.

Israel seeks to prevent the emergence of new centers of Islamist power on its borders. Turkey, on the other hand, is increasingly emerging as a political protector of forces that Tel Aviv considers a threat to its security. This conflict is not circumstantial… It is structural!