The special procedural safeguards for members of the executive branch were not established as a privilege to provide cover, but as a necessary bulwark against the criminalization of political life.
In a comprehensive interview with “Manifesto,” the well-known criminal law expert Sakis Kechagioglou takes a level-headed stance, “guided” by his experience and knowledge, on all the pressing issues.
In light of the constitutional revision, do you believe the method for electing the leadership of the supreme courts should change?
Justice must enjoy absolute functional and personal independence in the exercise of its judicial functions. However, in a well-governed parliamentary democracy, the complete institutional isolation and autonomy of any function from the source of all power—the sovereign people— constitutes a democratic deficit.
The principle of the separation of powers, as crystallized in European legal culture, requires institutional checks and balances and mutual oversight, not isolation.
The system established by the Constitution of 1975 (Article 90, paragraph 5) has been a pillar of our post-dictatorship stability and the consolidation of the rule of law. Any room for improvement in view of the constitutional revision must be sought exclusively in the direction of enhancing transparency and broadening the participation of the judiciary itself in the preliminary selection process, without, however, disrupting the time-tested constitutional balance that has served the country for more than half a century.
Should Article 86 on ministerial responsibility be amended as part of this same revision?
Institutional experience demonstrates that the need to definitively limit Parliament’s involvement in the criminal assessment of ministerial acts and to fully restore of the jurisdictional role of the ordinary courts. In this sense, the direction toward a new, more profound revision is imperative.
The structure of Article 86 must not be altered in the heat of political confrontation or with our eyes fixed on the expediencies of the past. Our goal must be a system in which criminal investigations are conducted exclusively by regular judges from the initial stage, ensuring absolute transparency and the procedural safeguards of the rule of law.
However, the constitutional order requires us to remember that the special procedural safeguards for members of the executive branch were not established as a privilege for cover-ups, but as a necessary bulwark against the criminalization of political life and the instrumentalization of criminal prosecution as a means of political elimination.
How do you view the debate regarding a temporary ban on retired judges and prosecutors assuming political or institutional positions?
This debate is not unique to Greece. In all mature democracies, there is a constant search for the right balance between the political rights of judicial officials and the need to protect the prestige of the judiciary.
A notable example is that of Germany, where judges can participate in political life and even be elected to Parliament. The public debate there does not focus on a ban, but rather on whether a judge’s political activity might affect the image of impartiality that he or she must project upon returning to judicial service.
In this light, I consider it reasonable to discuss the establishment of a brief transitional period between a senior judicial official’s retirement and their assumption of political or other high public offices.
Do you believe that the presumption of innocence was upheld in the case of OPEKEPE?
This principle becomes vital when it concerns public figures or cases with significant social impact. In an era of sensationalist televised trials, orchestrated leaks during pretrial proceedings, and digital “people’s courts”, the risk that social ostracism and moral condemnation will precede the judicial verdict itself is more apparent than ever.
As for the OPEKEPE case, my role as a defense attorney does not allow me to comment on the merits of a pending case; that is the exclusive purview of the competent courts.
What must be emphasized from an institutional standpoint, however, is that in this case—as in any other that stirs public opinion— the dangerous phenomenon of confusion has once again been observed: the criminal prosecution was equated with guilt, the investigation was equated with a conviction, and political confrontation replaced sober judicial judgment.
In a state governed by the rule of law, judges render their decisions based on the evidence presented in court and not under the influence of the clamor of current events or political expediency.
Do you agree with the release of individuals convicted of terrorism, such as Giotopoulos, through conditional release, or should there be stricter provisions?
In a state governed by the rule of law, laws are characterized by generality and abstractness; they are not enacted ad personam (tailored to specific individuals) nor are they applied selectively. Judicial discretion, therefore, must not depend on the prisoner’s name, nor on the degree of revulsion that his crime has instilled in society’s collective memory.
Undoubtedly, terrorism constitutes a crime of the utmost social and political reprehensibility, as it is directed against the very functioning of democracy. If the historical legislator determines, within the framework of its anti-crime policy, that certain specific crimes require the establishment of stricter formal or substantive criteria for acquittal, this falls within the sphere of his political responsibility.
What constitutes an institutional drift, however, is the instrumentalization of the law, the alteration of conditions depending on the circumstances, or the application of a “criminal law of the enemy” (Feindstrafrecht), in which the accused is treated not as a subject of rights, but as an existential threat.
Aside from great honor and recognition, what does your appointment as Grand Logothetes of the Law and Guardian of Justice mean to you in practice?
The institution of the Archons originated in times when Hellenism did not always have a state, but it did possess faith, education, language, and historical consciousness. Through these institutions, the identity of the Nation was kept alive during difficult times.
For me, therefore, this honor is first and foremost a reminder of a debt. A debt to the Church, to the Greek Diaspora, to the Patriarchates that continue to keep the flame of centuries burning, and to future generations to whom we owe it to pass on the values we have inherited in a strong and enduring way.
That is why I view this honor not as a reward for what I have done, but as a reminder of what I still have to offer.
