The point is made that “the Greek-French defence agreement serves not only as a tool of national deterrence, but also as a model for the gradual construction of a European defence architecture” by Dimitris Avramopoulos.
In an article in naftemporiki, the former European Commissioner underlines regarding the the upcoming visit of Emmanuel Macron to Athens, that it “goes beyond the bilateral level” and “indicates that Europe is looking for reliable partners in critical geographical areas“.
The article by Dimitris Avramopoulos reads as follows:
“European defence is not a new idea born under the pressure of today’s crises. On the contrary, it is a timeless issue of European integration, which recurs with different intensity at every historical turning point.
As early as 1954, the European Defence Community attempted to lay the foundations of a common European army. The project collapsed, largely because of French refusal, revealing the deep fears of loss of sovereignty that characterized Europe at the time.
Seven decades later, history returns in an almost ironic way. France, which then thwarted the prospect of a common defence, is now leading the search for a stronger European strategic autonomy. This shift is no accident. It reflects a deeper shift in the international system, where Europe is being asked to redefine its role. Not as a spectator of developments, but as acting with strategic will and operational capacity.
Europe is currently facing a complex security environment. The war in Ukraine, the conflicts in the Middle East, the instability in North Africa, the intensification of major power rivalries and the re-emergence of power as a decisive factor in international politics create a context of increased uncertainty. At the same time, hybrid threats, cybersecurity, the instrumentalisation of energy and migration flows are reshaping the concept of security, which now transcends traditional military boundaries.
In this environment, the European Union cannot continue to function solely as an economic union. Reality requires a transition to a union that also has a strategic substance. The concept of strategic autonomy is not about moving away from transatlantic relations, but about strengthening Europe’s capacity for action. NATO remains the main pillar of collective defence, but Europe must acquire the capacity to act when circumstances require it.
The decision to allocate some €850 billion to strengthen European defence is one of the most important developments of recent decades. It is not just an increase in defence spending. It is a practical recognition that security comes at a cost and that Europe has to bear it. However, the amount of money is not in itself a guarantee of success.
The critical issue is how these resources are used. Europe has over time been characterised by fragmentation in the field of defence. Multiple national programmes, different weapons systems, limited interoperability and the absence of a common industrial strategy create a less efficient and more costly system. If this new investment is not accompanied by substantial integration, there is a risk that the same problems will be reproduced on a larger scale.
This highlights the importance of the European defence industry. Europe cannot remain dependent on external suppliers in critical security areas. Developing indigenous know-how, strengthening the production base and investing in innovation are prerequisites for building real strategic autonomy. Defence is directly linked to the economy, technology and competitiveness. This dimension becomes even more important in the context of international competition.
Europe cannot remain a consumer of security in a world where technological superiority determines power. Defence innovation, from unmanned systems to space applications and cyber defence, is now a key area of strategic excellence.
Creating economies of scale, integrating the defence equipment market and strengthening European value chains can turn defence into a driver of overall European strength.In this way, investing in defence ceases to be just an expense and becomes a strategic investment in Europe’s future.
The debate, therefore, is not a technical one. It is deeply political. The question is not how much Europe will spend, but whether it is willing to act as a single strategic entity. And this is where the key challenge lies: overcoming national reservations in favour of a common European perspective.
In this context, the Greek-French strategic relationship takes on particular importance. Emmanuel Macron’s upcoming visit to Athens is not just another bilateral event. It is an indication that this relationship is now part of a wider European context, where bilateral partnerships act as catalysts for the shaping of common policies.
The importance of the visit goes beyond the bilateral level. It suggests that Europe is looking for reliable partners in critical geographical areas. The Eastern Mediterranean is one of them. In a region where energy interests, geopolitical tensions and maritime routes of strategic importance intersect, Greece is emerging as a factor of stability.
Greece should not be presented or perceived as a country trapped in periodic bouts of tension with Turkey. Such a reading would strategically limit its role and imprison it in a defensive narrative.
The emphasis, therefore, is not on confrontation, but on shifting the perspective: from managing a problem to demonstrating Greece’s strategic role as a factor of stability, consistency and institutional credibility in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Greece’s real value for Europe is broader and deeper. It is influenced by its geographical location, its participation in critical energy and transit routes, its naval power, its democratic stability and its status as a reliable member state in a region of high turbulence.
That is precisely why Greece can act as a soft power. Not in the sense of weakness, but in the sense of mature influence. As a country that radiates legitimacy, upholds international law, builds bridges of cooperation and offers stability instead of noise. Soft power does not negate the need for deterrence. It complements it and gives it depth and credibility.
In this context, the Franco-Greek defence agreement serves not only as a tool for national deterrence, but also as a model for the gradual establishment of a European defence architecture. It does not constitute a European NATO. But it does show how individual strategic partnerships can form a common defence core with political coherence and operational credibility.
In the same spirit, this agreement should not be interpreted as being directed against Turkey. Such an approach would be politically simplistic and strategically flawed.It was not established to fuel logics of confrontation, but to enhance deterrence credibility, establish a security framework and highlight a model of cooperation based on stability, respect for international law and balance of power.
The mutual defence assistance clausereinforces Greece’s deterrent power and at the same time adds a European dimension to the concept of security. It does not replace NATO, but works in a complementary way, reinforcing the multi-layered security architecture in Europe.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, this is of particular importance. Balance of power is a prerequisite for meaningful dialogue. Deterrence does not counter diplomacy. It makes it more effective and more credible. In an environment where the challenges are complex, the existence of clear alliances and stable rules acts as a deterrent to instability.
For France, working with Greece strengthens its presence in the Mediterranean and confirms its role as a key player in the debate on European defence. For Greece, this relationship is a lever for upgrading its geopolitical role and strengthening its international presence.
The crucial question, however, remains: can Europe turn this conjunctural mobilisation into a permanent strategic option?History shows that crises often act as catalysts for change, but maintaining momentum requires political will and consistency.
Today, conditions are different from 1954. The threats are more complex, the need for cooperation more urgent, and the tools available far greater. What remains a challenge is political unification in the field of defence.
For Greece, this juncture is both an opportunity and a responsibility. It must be an active participant in the shaping of European defence policy. Not as a country that seeks protection, but as a country that co-designs policies and produces strategic value.
Europe is facing a historic choice: either it will remain an economic power union with limited geopolitical influence, or it will evolve into a real strategic actor. This evolution is not predetermined. It will depend on the decisions taken today.
The €850 billion is an important tool. But it is not the goal. The goal is to create a Europe that can protect its interests, ensure its security and play an active role in the international system.
Political will will determine whether this opportunity will be transformed into real European power.”
