The new challenge by the prime minister of Northern Macedonia, Michkoski, at the unveiling of a monument in Albania, where he appeared to talk about “Macedonia” against the backdrop of the “Sun of Vergina”, is not just another isolated provocation.
It is part of a broader strategy of reintroducing symbols, terms and narratives that the Prespa Agreement, supposedly closed for good.
The event takes on particular significance because it comes not from fringe circles or nationalist organizations, but from the state’s own prime minister. And this is precisely what is now worrying not only Athens, but also EU diplomatic circles, which are watching the gradual deconstruction of the Prespa spirit with growing embarrassment.
“Exporting” challenges
Balkan media clearly documented the incident. The Bulgarian Actualno reported that the monument, inaugurated by Mitskoski in the Tuminets region of Albania, is dominated by the “Sun of Vergina”, a symbol directly linked to the Greek historical and cultural heritage of ancient Macedonia. The choice of this particular site, on Albanian soil, takes on added significance. It demonstrates an attempt by Mitskoski to “export” his alienation to neighbouring minorities, while testing the reflexes of the Tiranians, who are in their own delicate balance in their relations with Athens.
The problem, however, is not only symbolic. It is deeply political and geopolitical. The Prespes Agreement explicitly stipulated that Northern Macedonia had to withdraw the “Sun of Vergina” from public places, monuments and any state use, recognizing that the symbol belongs to the Greek historical heritage. In 2019, in fact, North Macedonia’s own media confirmed that the use of the symbol was officially banned.
Today, however, we see something different… Not just tolerance, but political re-legitimization of the official use of these symbols by the state of Skopje! Mitskoski seems to be systematically investing in a policy of “controlled violation” of the Prespa Agreement. He does not directly state that he is abolishing it… But he is attempting to corrupt it politically and psychologically through constant moves of low but sustained intensity, using the term “Macedonia”, public appearances with Greek symbols of ancient Macedonia, reviving narratives of historical continuity and fostering a new nationalist climate within the country. And this is happening at an extremely critical juncture for the Balkans.
European responsibilities
The EU is already facing serious difficulties in the region… Bulgarian veto over Skopje,Serbia-Kosovo tensions,increasing Russian and Turkish influence, political instability in Bosnia. In particular, the “freezing” of Skopje’s European perspective due to the Bulgarian veto offers Mickoski the ideal political pretext. He can now claim to his domestic audience that “since the EU is closing the door on us, we are returning to our roots”, thus legitimising the nationalist fold.
This is precisely where European stagnation meets Balkan nationalism. In this environment, the return of identitarian and historical conflicts in Skopje functions as a factor of destabilization rather than as an element of European accommodation.
It is no coincidence that even international analyses of Northern Macedonia now speak of increasing tension in Skopje’s relations with Brussels and of difficulties in aligning the Mitzkowski government with European demands. The “embarrassment” of Brussels, which is watching developments without any real intervention, is creating a political vacuum that Mitskoski is rushing to exploit.
Alert in Athens
For Athens, highlighting this very thing as a risk to the stability of Southeastern Europe may now be its strongest diplomatic argument. The real dimension of the issue, however, lies elsewhere. The “irredentism” of the Skopje leadership no longer functions only as a tool for internal consumption… It is gradually turning into a mechanism for political survival and geopolitical negotiation.
At a time when the Balkans are returning to the centre of the competitionbetween the West, Russia and Turkey, any revisionist crisis takes on much greater significance than in the past. Ankara is closely monitoring these developments, as any focus of pressure on Greece on its northern border works objectively in favor of Turkish strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, Russia has over time exploited Balkan tensions and has traditionally favored maintaining hotspots of instability in the region, as this makes it difficult to fully integrate the Western Balkans into the EU and the West in general.
In this environment, the Greek side cannot treat these incidents as yet another “quaint Balkan nationalism”. It is a gradual reintroduction of a policy that directly challenges the logic on which the Prespa Agreement was based and which now requires from Athens’ side a continuous and proactive diplomacy.
And perhaps this is the most important message behind Mickoski’s latest moves,that in the Balkans, agreements are not only judged when they are signed… They are judged every day by whether political leaders really believe in them or whether they are just waiting for the right moment to empty them from the inside!
