“No one can beat Mitsotakis,” argues the former Syriza government minister. Giorgos Stathakis putting Alexis Tsipras in the frame.
Ahead of the presentation of Alexis Tsipras’ party, Giorgos Stathakis claims that “late in the day, Tsipras was added to the ‘I will defeat Mitsotakis‘”. “Before his party even started, he declared that only he can. Even though he has been defeated five times before. The argument has a basis. Compared to the other leaders, he is indeed the best,” Giorgos Stathakis stressed, recalling the five consecutive defeats of Alexis Tsipras and SYRIZA in national and European elections.
In this spirit, George Stathakis said, “But on a political level, realistically, the best he can achieve is to claim ‘second place’ from PASOK.”
The post by George Stathakis in detail
Who will beat Mitsotakis?
Giorgos Stathakis (article in KReport today)
There have long been a growing number of contenders for the title “I can beat Mitsotakis”. Logical, after two four-year terms of the 40% ND. But the answer is still “nobody”. ND’s appeal may have been limited to 30% (70% say they are dissatisfied), maybe even lower, but in the fragmented opposition, no one comes close to 30%.
First among the challengers was Kasselakis. In SYRIZA’s internal party elections, as presidential candidate, he declared that only he could “beat Mitsotakis”. Achtioglou had avoided such an arrogant statement, insisting, and rightly so, on credible politics, broad parties, and alliances. The election of Kasselakis marked the definitive “end of SYRIZA”. Its dissolution is completed in our days.
The second is Androulakis. With only 12/13% electoral performance, and with “the needle stuck”, he keeps proclaiming that he can win even “with one vote”. This is not believable by anyone. Instead of a credible strategy of openings, alliances and political convergence, especially in a period of Syriza’s fragmentation, he chose self-sufficiency and “one vote”.
Followed third, in a small glimpse, by Ms Karystianou. Backed by the indeed impressive “Tempi movement”, she declared that she could win and hold the “Mitsotakis regime accountable”. However, her political discourse quickly weakened the project itself. The new party that is being launched will show its potential, but it is far from a party of claiming the leadership.
Later on, Tsipras was added to the “I will defeat Mitsotakis” ranks. Before his party had even started, he declared that only he could. And even though he has been defeated five times before. The argument has a basis. Compared to the other leaders, he is indeed the best. But on a political level, realistically, the best he can achieve is to claim “second place” from PASOK.
The two parties at plus or minus 15% do not threaten the hegemony of ND. The problem of the centre-left is rooted in the collapse of SYRIZA between 2019 and 2023 and the shrinking of the sum of PASOK and SYRIZA from 40% (2015 and 2019) to 30% (2023). The Syriza decline did not strengthen PASOK. It just shrunk the Central Left as a whole.
The causes of the collapse are obviously political. However, Tsipras’s own idea in 2019-23 was to expand SYRIZA, with politicians and members coming from the broader progressive This had divided the party at the time between its “presidential” and “leftist” tendencies.
The 2023 result was shocking. For supporters of enlargement, the cause was the internal conflict within Syriza. For the left wing, it was the enlargement itself that was to blame, weakening its character and nullifying the moral and value weight it had built up by governing.
The “Tsipras party” is a continuation of the political reasoning of 2019-2023. With the abandonment of SYRIZA itself, all in all. Tsipras without the “plumb party”. With direct “leadership supervision” and new political staff, he can make a difference.
So far, he has focused on recruiting people from within PASOK, -unelected MPs, MEPs, candidates for CE members (Saoulidis, Antonopoulou, Papadopoulou) and cadres (Siakantaris). A small core of the remaining SYRIZA and the New Left is added. And of course the emergence of new faces, despite the ambiguous experience of the previous project (Farantouris, Papas, Thraskia, Antonaros and a host of others).
In any case, the first polls will show the scope of the new venture. If it is within the limits of SYRIZA’s performance, i.e. 15-17%, Tsipras risks, like Androulakis, being trapped in the “with one vote” mode. If he moves above that, perhaps the project will make sense.
Of course, the central narrative is also pending. The Siakandaris Manifesto is grounded in a “Greek originality”. The unification, in one, of three political currents, which remain distinct “political families” (socialists, greens, left) on the European political scene and in the European Parliament. Practically and theoretically this is impossible. But the decisive factor will be the electoral programme.
In the end, directly, Mitsotakis is only in danger from New Democracy itself. It depends on the decline of its electoral strength. New Democracy has for years, as its worst performance, 27/28%. 40% is now unrealistic. Equally difficult is that it will fall below its historic low.
If performance is at the lows then any prospect of self-reliance will be lost. The loss of a large percentage will lead to the obvious conclusion that the cycle of Mitsotakis’ current leadership is over. Especially if Samaras’ party gains a few more points.
A new leader on the eve of the first elections would re-group the entire party (Samaras, Karamanlis) and pave the way to a higher electoral performance of a potential self-reliance. This electoral strategy naturally runs up against the fact that the Southwest is already locked into a political narrative with no possibility of renewal.
The country’s real problem is that major breakthroughs are needed to unstick the stagnant economy, distribute wealth more fairly, level out arbitrariness and environmental degradation, make the rule of law work, make deep reforms in the welfare state and administration, strengthen the legal charter and radically adjust foreign policy in light of new international challenges.
The “political vacuum” is the lack of forces with a “grand narrative” of radical changes, along the lines of 1981, 1996 or 2015. Today’s PASOK has nothing to do with “the PASOK of Change”, which impetuously grasped the great breakthroughs of the 1980s or Simitis’ “modernisation”, which renewed its political discourse. Today there is not even a central narrative. And as we all know, parties that have collapsed are hardly likely to return to a leading role.
Politics is now blatantly entangled with the demographic issue. PASOK (and SYRIZA) and late the “Tsipras party” are mobilising ageing publics. But the elections are won by the productive age groups. SYRIZA won in 2015 and held on in 2019 with minimal losses, sweeping among the young and working people in the popular districts. Among pensioners it lost by a landslide. PASOK is now permanently tested in the popular districts of the big cities.
Productive age groups and youth are the issue at stake in the next elections. But here we need a social and political current that will identify with a “grand narrative” of ruptures and changes. This remains so far the problem of the centre-left. Otherwise, “I will defeat Mitsotakis” will remain the alibi for the inability to pursue politics with a capital P.
